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Spaces for contestation: The politics of community development agreements  
in Sierra Leone 
 
Abstract 
Across mineral-rich sub-Saharan Africa, it has become increasingly common for mining companies 
to support development schemes in host communities where resource extraction takes place. The 
negotiation of so-called  ‘community development agreements’ (CDAs), provides an opportunity to 
address the social and environmental impacts of mining, while at the same time serving as a platform 
through which company-community relations can be mediated. Unlike discretionary corporate 
social responsibility programmes, in many countries, CDAs are embedded in law, invoking parties’ 
mutual commitments and responsibilities. Such initiatives have been heralded as ‘game–changers’, 
promising equitable redistribution of wealth, structured community development and stable 
investment climates for extractives companies. However, factors that concern the process of their 
negotiation, coupled with structural weaknesses, can affect their implementation, transforming 
them into spaces of contestation which can threaten their potential. Drawing upon fieldwork carried 
out in Sierra Leone between 2013-2018, this paper critically explores the contested nature of CDAs. 
Focusing on two different case studies in the south and east of the country, it argues that such 
agreements will only contribute to genuine development in host communities if the longstanding 
issues that have stalled the pre-existing forms and instruments of community development are 
systematically addressed.  
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, community development programmes have become embedded in the 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programmes of mining companies across the globe (Kemp 
and Owen, 2013; Newell, 2005; Hamann, 2003), as they are increasingly regarded as effective 
mechanisms through which  they can obtain their ‘social licence to operate’ (Moffat and Zhang, 
2014). Although voluntary community development programmes have for a long time defined 
mining companies’ CSR strategies, many resource-rich governments are now changing tack, 
formally adopting laws that force mining companies to pay for and carry out socio-economic 
development projects in communities where resource extraction is taking place (Dupuy, 2014). In 
theory, such Community Development Agreements (CDAs) can provide an effective instrument for 
‘locking in’ all parties to long-term development commitments, defining mutual obligations and 
building a shared sense of responsibility (EI Sourcebook, 2011). Moreover, CDAs can facilitate the 
mitigation and resolution of community-company conflicts (Gathii and Odumosu-Ayanu, 2016), 
particularly in situations where governments fail to effectively provide basic services for resource 
endowed communities, and companies are forced to intervene in order to wade off opposition to 
their operations (Nwapi, 2017).  
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However, there is no guarantee that CDAs will deliver these benefits, as much depends on the 
context, the design of the CDA itself, and the way it is implemented. In fact, it has been observed 
that CSR approaches which prioritise ‘risk mitigation’ and corporate public relations often tend to 
shape their community engagement programmes based on the benefits that accrue to the company, 
rather than the actual development needs of local communities (Owen and Kemp, 2012). Evidence 
further suggests that corporate-sponsored community development often tends to be conservative, 
with many companies seeking to control and regulate development processes implemented in host 
communities (Banks et al., 2013). Other commentators note that corporate-sponsored development 
programmes may deliberately try to avoid supporting certain kinds of community development, as 
empowered communities may pose a greater risk to business success and profitability (Kemp, 2010). 
O’Faircheallaigh (2013) raises some key challenges that concern the successful implementation of 
CDAs in the mining sector, including the implications of unequal bargaining and power 
relationships between communities and companies, inequity in the distribution of benefits generated 
by CDAs, and the enforceability of agreements. Focusing more specifically on the African context, 
Nwapi (2017) further highlights the differing approaches to CDAs that various African countries 
have adopted, arguing that a number of factors determine the success or failure of an agreement, 
including: the definition of ‘community’, the conditions under which the CDA is created, the 
enforceability of the agreement, the success of compliance monitoring, the institutional framework 
for the implementation of CDAs and the shortcomings of various political regimes.  
Building on this growing critical literature, this paper focuses on the case of Sierra Leone, narrowing 
in on the contested nature of CDA negotiations and exploring more specifically the politics that 
envelop the development and implementation of such schemes.  Focusing on two different case 
studies in the south and east of the country, the paper argues that CDA agreements will only 
contribute to genuine development in host communities if the longstanding issues that have stalled 
the pre-existing forms and instruments of community development are systematically addressed. In 
particular, a number of factors have shaped, and will continue to shape, the outcomes of CDAs 
including: the laws and traditions governing the ownership of land; elite bargaining schemes 
prevalent in particular mining localities; pre-existing company-community forms of engagements; 
the ‘image’ of companies; and provisions in laws and policies governing mineral wealth 
redistribution, including the mineral lease agreements signed between the Government of and 
companies. Indeed, such factors have shaped previous attempts to foster community development 
in mining areas, particularly in the aftermath of the country’s decade-long civil war of the 1990s, 
where successive governments have introduced progressive policies and programmes geared 
towards improving extractive sector governance, rent sharing, peacebuilding, and the equitable 
distribution of resource wealth (Nwapi, 2017; Dupuy, 2014; Maconachie, 2010). For example, in 
2001, the Government introduced the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF) 
through which 0.75% of the 3% export tax from artisanal diamonds is returned to host communities 
for local development (Maconachie, 2010; 2009; 2012; World Bank, n.d.; Dupuy, 2016). The Mines 
and Minerals Act of 2009 (MMA 2009) also provides a framework through which landowning 
families, whose lands have been affected by the operations of mining companies, are compensated. 
The MMA 2009 obliges all small and large-scale mining companies to sign Community 
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Development Agreements (CDAs) with host communities, through which their relations should be 
mediated.  
This article traces and analyses the process leading to the design and implementation of Sierra 
Leone’s Model Community Development Agreement (MCDA), through which the Government 
redistributes resource rents to communities affected by small and large-scale mining to promote 
community development. The main question it seeks to investigate is, why, despite the enactment 
of CDA provisions into law in 2009, are mining communities still confronted with the perennial 
challenges of elite capture, power imbalances, exploitation and underdevelopment? It is argued that 
although the aim of reinvesting resource rents in communities affected by mining through CDAs 
represents a positive departure from previous exploitative and patrimonial governance practices, 
factors that concern the process of their negotiation, coupled with structural weaknesses, continue 
to threaten their design, implementation and success. Moreover, the redistribution of resource rents 
will only contribute to meaningful development in host communities, if the longstanding issues that 
have stalled pre-existing forms of community development are systematically addressed, a process 
which would involve the restructuring of power relations between communities, companies and the 
political class.  
As previously noted, the argument developed in the paper focuses on two main case studies in Sierra 
Leone, drawing upon a range of interviews and focus group discussions conducted with affected 
community leaders, mining company officials, civil society activists, local and central government 
officials and donor staff. In the first period of fieldwork between 2013 and 2015, data were 
intermittently collected from a mine site located in the south of the country – Mobimbi, where Sierra 
Rutile Limited, a company that is listed on the London Stock Exchange, has operated for many 
years. Follow-up interviews and focus group discussions were conducted at the site in November 
2017. During the second phase of fieldwork between January and November 2017, data were 
collected in Koidu at the site of Koidu Holdings Limited, a Kimberlite diamond mine in Kono 
District owned by the Israeli businessman Beny Steinmetz. Although these two sites represent the 
paper’s main cases, where necessary reference is made to other sites managed by small and large-
scale companies in other parts of the country, in order to reinforce the arguments put forward in the 
paper.   
Interview and focus group discussion data were complemented by observations and discussions by 
one of the authors, while serving on the CDA working group which was set up by the Government 
of Sierra Leone to develop the MCDA, as well as support its implementation. Given the delays 
between the time of the signing of the CDAs (2016 – 2017), and the payment of the companies’ 
contributions (early 2018), the scope of the paper does not go beyond the latter, a period that 
coincided with the end of the first phase of research. Elite based interviews were conducted in 
Freetown, Koidu and Mobimbi with government and donor officials, chiefs, company executives, 
as well as civil society activists. Secondary data including company, government and civil society 
reports have also been analysed to support the paper’s argument. In order to ensure that informants 
were able to express themselves freely during interviews and focus group discussions, the sessions 
were conducted anonymously, except where respondents expressed consent to be explicitly 
identified (Fig. 1).  
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Figure 1: Key actors in the CDA process at the time of fieldwork 
 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, section two provides some important 
contextual background, by introducing CDA requirements in Sierra Leone’s mining law and 
companies’ Mineral Lease Agreements (MLAs), as well as the MCDA developed by the 
Government of Sierra Leone. Here, the analysis draws out some of the inconsistencies and 
contradictions within such legal documents, which have contributed to a fraught process of CDA 
implementation. Section three critically explores the political economy of the CDA working group, 
set up by the government to develop the MCDA, as well as support its implementation. It 
demonstrates how difficult policy processes and dialogue can be, in contexts where actors’ interests 
are in many ways different from those of the communities they claim to represent. In the fourth 
section, the paper analyses the consultation processes that led to the selection of Primary Host 
Communities (PHCs), examining strategies of “inclusion” and “exclusion”, a process that invariably 
produces (and reproduces) “winners” and “losers”. Section five analyses the politics that underpin 
the signing of the CDAs and the contestations over the payments of the funds by the companies, 
whilst the sixth section provides some concluding remarks. 
2. The legal foundations of CDAs in Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone is among a growing number of countries that have enacted CDA provisions into law, 
making it obligatory for small and large-scale mining companies to enter into agreements with their 
PHCs (Nwapi, 2017; Dupuy, 2014). The parent law from which the country’s CDAs derive their 
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legitimacy is the Mines and Minerals Act of 2009 (MMA 2009), which sets out the obligations of 
mining companies to PHCs, outlining how the latter are defined and chosen from among a number 
of interconnected communities affected by the operations of mining companies. Supplementary 
legal provisions for CDAs are also contained in the individual Mining Lease Agreements (MLAs) 
of companies, as well as the Model Community Development Agreement (MCDA) which was 
drafted by a multi-stakeholder working group (Interview with Civil Society Activist, Freetown, 14 
November 2017). Although the intent of these legal and regulatory documents is to ensure certainty 
and clarity with respect to parties’ obligations and expectations within the framework of CDAs, they 
suffer from inconsistencies, and have contributed to making their implementation a contested 
process. For example, section 138 of the MMA 2009 states that: 
The holder of a small-scale or large-scale mining licence shall assist in the development of mining 
communities affected by its operations to promote sustainable development, enhance the general 
welfare and the quality of life of the inhabitants, and shall recognize and respect the rights, customs, 
traditions and religion of local communities (Government of Sierra Leone, 2009:106). 
 
The above section states the general principle of what is expected of mining companies in relation 
to the development of their host communities. Whereas previously, companies’ contributions were 
dependent on discretionary CSR, the law makes it mandatory for them to play a role in community 
development. However, subsequent provisions in the law which specifically oblige companies to 
enter into CDAs with PHCs are less clear. If anything, they contradict the general principle of 
responsibility of the companies to contribute to the development of affected communities. For 
instance, section 139 (1) of the MMA 2009 states that ‘the holder of a small-scale or large-scale 
mining licence is required to have and implement a community development agreement with the 
primary host community…’ (Government of Sierra Leone, 2009:106). Juxtaposed with section 138, 
the insertion of the subjective term, primary host community, reinforces the process of ‘inclusion’ 
and ‘exclusion’ and of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in communities whose welfare and quality of life are 
affected either directly or indirectly by the operations of mining companies, no matter where they 
are located.   
 
While an attempt has been made in section 139 (2) to clarify what a PHC is, the contradiction is 
further compounded by the provision that the PHC is a single ‘…community of persons mutually 
agreed by the holder of the small-scale or largescale mining licence and the local council …within 
thirty kilometres… of any boundary defining the large-scale mining licence area’ (Government of 
Sierra Leone, 2009: 107). ‘Proximity’ is thus prioritised over ‘impact’, leaving room for 
communities outside the 30 kilometre radius, but affected by the company’s operations, to contest 
their exclusions. In contexts where the operations of mining companies span several villages, with 
chiefdoms and districts directly and indirectly affected by their operations, the question then arises 
as to how the PHC is determined without causing further disruptions to pre-existing communal ties, 
as well as ensuring an equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of mining among communities.  
 
All of Sierra Leone’s large-scale mining companies are affected by this challenge: Sierra Rutile 
Limited, a subsidiary of Iluka, operates in five chiefdoms spanning two districts; Sierra Minerals 
Holding’s operations span eight chiefdoms; Shandong Steel, formerly African Minerals, operates 
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across eleven chiefdoms, in three districts; and the operations of the diamond mining company, 
Koidu Holdings Limited, affect two chiefdoms in Kono District. This fact therefore makes it less 
useful to only use a measure of ‘proximity’ in the determination of the PHC. In addition, even where 
multiple communities are affected, some may be more affected than others even within the same 
chiefdom or district. Such is the case with Koidu Holdings Limited, where Tankoro is the chiefdom 
that is directly affected, but Gbense its neighbour, has been incorporated into the CDA through the 
participation of the Koidu New Sembehun City Council, given that the boundaries of the two 
chiefdoms overlap within its jurisdiction.  
 
Another issue at the heart of contestations between mining companies and communities in the 
negotiation of CDAs is the amount of financial resources that companies are required to contribute 
to the process. Framers of the MMA 2009 attempted to harmonise companies’ CDA contributions 
by requiring them to annually spend on their host communities “…no less than one percent of one 
percent of the gross revenue amount earned by the mining operations in the previous year to 
implement the agreement…” (Government of Sierra Leone, 2009: 107). However, this amount has 
come under scrutiny from stakeholders including the government, communities and civil society, 
who argue that it is a paltry sum relative to the annual turnover of companies. The official 
explanation given by Government of Sierra Leone officials for the insignificant contributions the 
companies are required to make is that the original intention was for them to contribute 1% of their 
annual turnover, and that the 0.01 percent contained in the law, is the result of a typographical error 
(Interview with Government Official, Freetown, 13 July 2017). This explanation, however, seems 
unlikely, given that the MMA 2009 had to go through several phases of drafting and a gruelling 
legislative process. 
 
However, interviews with civil society and community activists reveal a more cynical picture, 
suggesting a deliberate action at the time of the drafting of the law to make the companies pay less, 
as part of the government’s “concessions to companies for investing in what was at the time an 
unattractive investment destination” (Interview with Civil Society Activist, Freetown, 14 November 
2017). The challenge that government officials faced at the time is one that countries with 
unattractive investment environments have to grapple with, as they constantly weigh up the costs of 
‘over’ taxing companies, against those of them taking their investments elsewhere. As Batty has 
argued, while mining companies supported the enactment of the MMA 2009, “they expressed an 
unwillingness to cooperate if the government increased tariffs and royalties beyond what they 
deemed profitable for their operations” (Batty 2013: 366–7). It would therefore appear that rather 
than losing on taxes and royalties accruable to the government, communities’ development needs 
were part of the sacrifice that the government was prepared to make to retain the investments of 
companies. Nonetheless, what communities lost in the MMA 2009, they were able to gain in the 
companies’ individual Mineral Lease Agreements (MLAs), when the government renegotiated them 
with the companies. Table 1 below illustrates the financial contribution that companies agreed to 
make to the implementation of CDAs based on their individual MLAs before the crash of 
commodity prices in 2014, which saw African Minerals and London Mining going into 
administration.  
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Table 1: CDA Contributions by Mineral Lease Agreement 
 
Company                        CDA contributions as per MLAs____     
Koidu Holdings Limited          0.25% 
African Minerals           0.1% 
Sierra Minerals Holdings I Limited                      1.0% 
Sierra Rutile Limited            US%75,000 or 0.1 
London Mining                                         1.0%  
Source: Compiled by the authors from the MLAs of the companies.  
 
One noticeable result of the revisions to CDAs was that companies were to make different 
contributions, as opposed to the harmonized contributions stipulated in the MMA 2009. On paper, 
Sierra Minerals Holding and London Mining were to be the largest joint contributors with 1% of 
annual turnover before tax; followed by Koidu Holdings Limited with 0.25% and African Minerals 
0.1%. Sierra Rutile Limited’s MLA, which was revised in 2004 long before the MMA 2009 was 
enacted, did not make any reference to a CDA, but rather to an Agricultural Development Fund to 
which it would to contribute “US$75,000.00 or one tenth of one percent (0.1%) of gross sales free 
alongside ship at the Sierra Leone port of shipment...” whichever was higher. It is not entirely clear 
what accounted for the variations in companies’ respective CDA contributions after the revisions, 
but as one government  official put it, “the variations are probably due to the transactional pattern 
of contract negotiations, and I am sure there are trade-offs” (Interview with Government Official, 
Freetown, 14 January 2018). Transactional patterns of negotiations in the mining sector are well 
established, featuring not only in the negotiation of MLAs, but also in the informal adjustment of 
taxes in the export of minerals to disproportionately benefit one set of exporters against others, 
regardless of pre-existing legal taxation regimes (Interview with Government Official, Freetown, 
15 September 2017).  As will be demonstrated later in the paper, the payment of CDA contributions 
has also been affected by this phenomenon, despite the provisions in the MMA 2009 and the MLAs 
of the companies. Now that the legal foundations of the CDAs, as well as their contentious basis 
have been established, the next section of the paper will shift to focus on the development of the 
Model CDA, and the political economy of the  technical working group that was set up to draft it.    
 
3. The political economy of the CDA working group  
  
Although the MMA 2009 makes provisions for mining companies to implement CDAs with their 
PHCs, it was not until 2013 that the first practical steps were taken towards their implementation. 
The setting up of the National Minerals Agency (NMA) in 2012, fulfilled a long-standing demand 
by donors and civil society for the policy and regulatory functions within the mining sector to be 
separated between the Ministry of Mines and the NMA respectively (Interview with civil society 
activist, Freetown, 14 November 2017; Interview with government of Sierra Leone official, 
Freetown, 13 August 2014). The NMA established a multi-stakeholder CDA Working Group 
consisting of officials from civil society, government, donors and the mining companies to develop 
the MCDA template to guide the development of agreements across all mining sites. Whereas the 
final version of the MCDA relied on the MMA 2009 for its guiding principles, the idea of a Model 
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Agreement was itself somewhat in opposition to the spirit of the MMA 2009, which notes that “a 
community development agreement shall take into account the unique circumstances of the licence 
holder and primary host community…” (Government of Sierra Leone 2009: 109). However, the 
generic need to address the power imbalance between communities and mining companies 
necessitated a Model Agreement. Communities’ lack of capacity to negotiate original CDAs with 
mining companies, who can afford the best legal advice available, made a Model Agreement 
inevitable (Interview with Government Official, Freetown, 13 August 2014).  
 
The provisions of the MCDA are prescriptive and generic. These include: 1) how negotiations, if 
any, should be conducted; 2) the parties’ mutual obligations, such as communities’ recognition of 
the right of companies to operate in a peaceful environment; 3) when and how to review the 
agreement; 4) the approval process; 5) the decision making structures; 6) representation of 
communities’ heterogeneous groups; 7) positive and negative lists detailing projects on which CDA 
funds can, and cannot be spent; and 8) perhaps more importantly for host communities whose MLA 
would change hands from one company to another during the life of agreements, the Model noted 
that: 
 
In the event that the Mining Lease Agreement held by the Mineral Right Holder subject to this 
Agreement is transferred to a third party, the transferee shall be deemed to have assumed all rights 
and obligations of the transferor under this Agreement (Government of Sierra Leone, n.d.: 10). 
 
The issue of the transferability of CDA liabilities from one company to another is critical for mining 
host communities in a country such as Sierra Leone, where there is a history of frequent changes in 
mining rights ownership. But the challenges associated with the ‘inherited commitments’ of 
companies’ community development programmes, is, of course, not peculiar to Sierra Leone. As 
Hilson (2011) notes, across sub-Saharan Africa, it is exceedingly difficult to predict how new 
ownership will approach the interrelated challenges of environmental protection and community 
development, following the takeover of a mine.  As we shall see, in the case of Sierra Leone, it is 
an issue that has formed part of the cause of the many disagreements between companies and their 
PHCs.  
 
The process of developing the MCDA was as contentious as it was exclusionary. The communities 
affected by mining were not directly represented in the Working Group, and the political 
‘manoeuvres’ that took place during negotiations illustrate the difficulties involved in such policy 
processes.  It became clear that the interests of some of the actors were diametrically opposed to 
those of others, which affected progress in the drafting of the Agreement and its eventual 
implementation. Civil society representatives attempted to suppress other actors’ voices and views, 
while amplifying their own, by constantly reminding them of the fact that they were the leading 
advocates for the adoption of CDAs in the country, and consequently should have a preponderant 
voice in the process (Interview with civil society activist 24 April 2014). This assertion was, 
however, challenged by both the government and donor officials who argued that such claims were 
only meant to mask civil society agendas (Interview with donor official, Freetown, 8 August 2018; 
Interview with government official, 13 July 2017).  
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Indeed, beyond the drafting of the Model Agreement, civil society organisations wanted to carve 
out a major role for themselves in the implementation of the CDAs – both in terms of representation 
in the Community Development Committees (CDCs) that would determine which community 
development projects were pursued, and in terms of the monitoring of their implementation – which 
raised conflict of interest concerns for other actors (Interview with donor official, Freetown, 8 
August 2018). The desire of civil society actors to assume a dominant role in the CDA process was 
rejected by government officials, because they saw it as an intrusion into their mandate under the 
authority of the NMA to oversee the implementation of the CDAs.  The government therefore 
moved to dissolve the working group as soon as the draft agreement was completed (Interview with 
government official, Freetown, 15 September 2017). Even before the Model Agreement had been 
drafted, some civil society organisations had already secured donor funding for the national rollout 
(interview with civil society activist, 13 April 2014), dismissing donors’ suggestion for a pilot in 
one or two mining sites that would generate lessons for guiding national implementation.  
 
It is important to note that when it came to debates over a “pilot” versus “national rollout”, both 
civil society and government representatives were unanimously opposed to any suggestions of a 
pilot, preferring instead a national rollout, with all its potential disadvantages (Interview with donor 
official, Freetown, 8 August 2018). One civil society representative, who reckoned that donors’ 
concerns, especially those of the World Bank, had to do with the availability of resources, noted:  
 
…the World Bank should take their money, if their concern is about money. We are also capable of 
raising funds, and this is the reason why every company should be involved in the process (Discussion 
with Civil Society Activist, 13 April 2014).  
 
The Bank was one of two donors represented in the CDA working group, together with the 
international development arm of the German Government, GIZ. While donors’ role was mostly 
limited to providing “expert advice”, it was not always welcome, especially when it went against 
the interests of other actors.  The role of the World Bank was particularly criticised by civil society 
representatives who regarded its approach of fostering critical debate as disruptive, time wasting 
and undermining the principles of national ownership (Discussion with Civil Society Activist, 13 
April 2014). 
 
Concerns that the World Bank was slowing progress, and that its policy advice was often oblivious 
to the country context, were frequently raised by the government and civil society representatives. 
Such concerns reflected a growing atmosphere of anti-donor sentiments amid a booming mining 
sector at the time, as well as fears of both the NMA and civil society not meeting their annual targets. 
For civil society representatives, the time-bound funding which they had secured from donors for 
the implementation of the CDAs meant that speed was to be prioritised over the quality of 
implementation. The NMA, on the other hand, wanted a ‘fast track’ national rollout because they 
thought it was easily achievable, and had included the signing of five CDAs across five sites by 
December 2014, in their Performance Management Contract with State House (Discussion with 
Government Official, Freetown, 13 August 2014). However, the optimism harboured by the NMA 
10 
 
 
to be able to facilitate the signing of five CDAs, was not informed by an understanding of the socio-
economic and political realities that shaped the operations of the companies, the dynamics that 
underpinned company–community relations, or inter-community and intra-community relations 
(Interview with donor official, Freetown, 8 August 2018). The first CDA was not signed until 23 
December 2016, by Sierra Minerals Holdings, more than two years behind schedule (Interview with 
Government Official, Freetown, 15 September 2017).  
 
The relationship between civil society and mining companies’ representatives in the working group 
was also not cordial, as the latter rejected civil society demands for an enlarged role after the drafting 
of the MCDA; and the reason for the rejection was more substantial, given that had the working 
group accepted such a suggestion, the CDAs would have become much more embroiled in 
contestations than they are today. While the working group represented one of few forums where 
civil society and mining companies worked together, their relationship has never been cordial. The 
end of the civil war in 2002 saw the emergence of vibrant extractive-based civil society 
organizations which have constantly raised the concerns of mining affected communities, while 
putting pressure on the government to ensure an equitable spread of benefits to such communities 
(Dupuy, 2014; Fanthorpe and Gabelle, 2013). A 2007 study of the operations of mining companies 
in Kono District, for example, painted a picture of exploitation, environmental degradation and a 
lack of commitment by the companies to meaningful community development (NMJD and CJM, 
2007). 
  
By the time the first CDA was signed, the working group had been dissolved with the NMA firmly 
in charge, and civil society organizations had withdrawn from the process, albeit grudgingly. As 
one of their representatives put it, “I was with them up to a point when the NMA said they didn’t 
need civil society going forward. So I had to withdraw from the process because I realized we were 
no longer needed” (Interview with Civil Society Activist, Freetown, 14 November 2017). The 
actions of the NMA to limit civil society’s participation in the implementation of the CDAs has 
received backing from donors, and as one of them remarked, “there were CSOs who had their own 
agendas, using the working group as a platform to always be involved in the process, not necessarily 
because they wanted to contribute to its effective implementation” (Interview with donor official, 
Freetown, 8 August 2017). 
 
4. PHC identification and the production of “winners” and “losers”  
In many ways, the processes underlining CDA consultations and their outcomes reflected wider 
fears expressed by some on the CDA Working Group in relation to challenges of elite capture, with 
council leaders and chiefs playing a dominant role. Although local council leaders are popularly 
elected by universal adult suffrage, they have frequently been the subject of corruption allegations 
(Conteh, 2016; 2017). The election of chiefs on the other hand, has been the subject of much 
resentment, as they are restrictively elected by tribal authorities made up mostly of men – excluding 
woman, youths and other vulnerable groups. However, as with the local councils, chiefdom 
governance has been characterised by corruption, exclusion and marginalization of the poor (Conteh 
2014; Richards, 1996).  
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The implementation of the CDAs was a process that was not immune to these underlying power 
differentials.  Initial stakeholder consultations and the identification of PHCs were processes that 
proved difficult given the many actors involved (especially those who feared their exclusion), and 
the complex pre-existing dynamics through which mining company–community relations were 
mediated. CDAs were going to be implemented in contexts in which all mining companies had pre-
existing community development arrangements, with paramount chiefs and local councils as the 
principal interlocutors of communities, and who, along with other members of the elite, formed the 
participants in the consultation meetings. One of the authors attended two CDA consultation 
meetings in two mining sites in the north of the country in July 2014, and at both meetings women 
and youths were noticeably absent. Participants were mainly drawn from the central government, 
companies, chiefs, local councils and other groups often under the control of the elite.  The 
patriarchal basis of the communities thus manifested itself, and the established patterns of 
transactions between chiefs, companies and local councils dominated many of the discussions that 
took place, without any representation of the views of ordinary people.  
 
For example, Sierra Rutile Limited had set up the Sierra Rutile Foundation (SRF) in 2009, and 
subsequently entered into an agreement with the two District Councils of Bonthe and Moyamba, 
and not directly with the affected communities, for the implementation of a number of development 
projects (Interview with Head of Community Relations, Sierra Rutile Limited, Mobimbi, 24 May 
2014).  However, the Foundation’s establishment had more to do with a business and publicity need, 
than a genuine desire to ensure community development. It was set up as part of the conditions for 
an unsuccessful loan application, which the company had submitted to the International Finance 
Corporation (Discussion with Government of Sierra Leone official, Freetown, 16 May 2014). Sierra 
Minerals Holding also had a similar foundation, and while companies supported community 
development through principles of CSR, funds were frequently captured by chiefs in very 
personalised transactions, such as the provision of private vehicles, which were not always recorded 
in companies’ books (Interview with Sierra Minerals Holding official, Mobimbi, 22 November 
2018). Chiefs’ lack of transparency is perhaps best summed up by one chief when asked about how 
much she had received from Sierra Rutile Limited in the previous year. She replied: “if it were you, 
would you tell people how much you’re paid?” (Interview, Paramount Chief of Imperi Chiefdom, 
Gbangbama, 25 May 2014). A senior official of Sierra Rutile Limited acknowledged the difficulties 
faced in formalizing support to their wider host communities at the time, but noted that they had 
moved from when communities did not have an impressive view of their support, “to having the 
cost of expenditure on the community as part of the operational cost of the company” (Interview 
with Sierra Rutile Limited official, Mobimbi, 24 May 2014).   
 
It is thus clear that those who had disproportionately benefited from the pre-existing arrangements 
would be opposed to the CDAs, whose aim, at least on paper, was the expansion of mining benefits 
to wider communities. For example, during stakeholder consultations, the Community Relations 
Department of Sierra Rutile Limited demonstrated misgivings about the CDA and argued for the 
foundation to be maintained, suggesting that procedures of the CDA would be too elaborate for 
communities to understand and implement (Interview with Head of Community Affairs 
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Department, Sierra Rutile Limited, Mobimbi, 24 May 2014). Likewise, an official of Sierra Minerals 
Holding put forward a legal argument that their MLA called for a foundation, not a CDA (Interview 
with Chief Finance Officer, Sierra Minerals Holding, 25 May 2014). While such concerns were 
accepted as genuine, donors, however, sensed a fear among Community Department Relations staff 
of companies and chiefs, that the foundations would be dislodged. The personalised and opaque 
manner in which they had managed pre-existing relations would not be accommodated by the 
CDAs, which called for increased accountability (Interview with donor official, Freetown, 26 
November 2018). Since the Sierra Rutile Foundation was established in 2009, it was never 
registered, nor its accounts externally audited, a fact that led to delays in the company paying its 
CDA contributions after the agreement was signed with the communities in 2017 (Interview with 
Managing Director, Sierra Rutile Limited, Mobimbi, 22 November 2017). A 2012 Internal value 
for money audit of projects implemented by the company’s Community Relations Department found 
significant differences between project costs and the actual value of final outputs (Interview, 
Assistant District Officer, Bonthe, 26 May 2014).    
 
The identification of PHCs followed the consultations, and while the MCDA remains largely 
prescriptive, the relative realities in the mining communities have tended to dictate the approach 
adopted by the NMA in deciding which communities are included and excluded, in some ways 
reflecting tensions between law, policy and realism. Whereas the CDA working group had been 
rigid in its approach, the NMA adopted the principle of ‘flexibility’, recognising the varied and 
complex dynamics of mining communities (Interview with Government of Sierra Leone official, 
Freetown, 27 June 2014). The principle of flexibility thus recognised the need to thread carefully 
with pre-existing channels of company sponsored community development, as well as long-standing 
inter and intra-communal relations in affected communities. Flexibility, however, also has its 
shortcomings, including that of fostering inconsistency and reinforcing exploitative channels and 
forms of community development which have not ensured equitable redistribution of resource 
wealth. For example, where company foundations existed as in Sierra Rutile, the NMA was initially 
amenable to allowing them to serve as the basis from which CDAs would eventually evolve 
(Discussion with Government of Sierra Leone official, Freetown, 27 June 2014). This was, however, 
opposed by the community, and a change in the ownership of the company not only led to the 
termination of the foundation, but also the first ever audit by external auditors, whose report was 
still pending at the time of writing (Interview with Managing Director, Sierra Rutile Limited, 
Mobimbi, 22 November 2017).  
 
However, a consistent feature of the PHC identification process has been the pre-selection of PHCs 
by stakeholders who do not always represent the diverse interests of communities (focus group 
discussions in Mobimbi and Koidu in November 2017). For the most part, PHC identification 
meetings have been rubber-stamping forums, in which prepared lists of PHCs are approved by 
participants and endorsed by the NMA, with outcomes only ever being challenged after the meetings 
have concluded. This is not surprising given that participants are mostly elite actors – chiefs, 
members of parliament (MPs), local council officials and other co-opted individuals, whose interests 
often converge, given the homogeneity and less conflictual basis of their interests (Conteh, 2017). 
The fact that local councils, which by law should jointly decide the PHC with companies, would 
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concede to the active participation of other members of the political class, while excluding ordinary 
community members, is indicative of elite solidarity, regardless of existing legal constraints. Thus, 
limiting participation in the PHC identification process to the elite, introduces a completely new 
dimension to the politics of CDAs based on class, and through which processes of “inclusion” and 
“exclusion” are reinforced by long-standing structural factors underpinning the distribution of 
power and resources, and not necessarily by ‘proximity’ or ‘impact’.  
 
Whereas the CDA process has been dominated by the elite, their dominance has not gone 
unchallenged, with land owners perhaps providing the biggest threat. Indeed, ownership of land, as 
we shall see, accords one a number of privileges in Sierra Leone. In all mining sites, the 
identification of PHCs has been carried out with varying degrees of participation of the key 
stakeholders identified above. Although the meetings have led to agreements on the PHCs for each 
mining company, some of the processes and outcomes have been challenged by those that have felt 
marginalized or excluded. Two cases deserve special attention here – one at the Sierra Rutile 
Limited site which led to intra–community disagreement, and the other at Koidu Holdings Limited, 
which also sparked an inter–community dispute. At Sierra Rutile Limited, members of the Land 
Owner’s Association have contested what they have referred to as their limited representation in the 
CDA process, given that “only two of our members represent us in the CDC”, as well as the 
exclusion of its chairman from the process (Interview with Chairman Land Owners Association, 
Mobimbi, 21 November 2017). They also contended that because they have leased their lands to the 
company, and some of their members have been relocated, they should be the main beneficiaries of 
the CDA, despite receiving surface and other rent payments from the company.  
 
The ownership of land in rural Sierra Leone, is in most cases vested in “land-owning families”, but 
held in “trust” by Paramount Chiefs regarded as “custodians” of all lands in their respective 
chiefdoms. Generally, land-owning families are those that can “…trace their lineage to the ‘original’ 
inhabitants of the village…” (Ryan, 2018: 194). They have unrestricted land use rights, as well as 
the privilege to dispose of it to “strangers”, including multinational corporations, for which they are 
to receive annual surface rents. . Although it is generally assumed that “the natural resources of a 
country belong, after all, to its people” (Wenar, 2008: 9), mining communities across Sierra Leone 
do not necessarily share this view of collective national ownership, instead projecting a rather 
community–centric claim to them. For instance, the indigenes of Kono, the country’s most 
diamondiferous district, “have historically insisted that profits from diamonds mined in their district 
belong primarily to Konos” (Batty, 2013: 365). This position is undoubtedly a reaction to decades 
of environmental damage and human rights violations caused by mining, without any corresponding 
investments in the district by mining companies and governments.  
 
Beyond the debates over who should be the main beneficiaries of the CDA at the Sierra Rutile 
Limited mine site, longstanding disagreements between the company and the leadership of the Land 
Owners Association (representing the interests of land-owning families)  have also influenced on-
going tensions. The Chairman of the Land Owners Association has argued that he has not been made 
Chairman of the CDC, nor allowed to be a member because of his longstanding activism against the 
company and chiefly structures that he alleges are responsible for the suffering of land owners 
14 
 
 
(Interview with Chairman Land Owners Association, Mobimbi, 21 November 2017). This has been 
disputed by the Chairman of the CDC who has argued that the Chairman is not actually a landowner, 
and that “he has been pretending to be one, which is a very dishonest thing to do” (Interview with 
Chairman, CDC, Mobimbi, 22 November 2018). The right to participate in the CDA process, which 
can be derived from being part of the political class as we have seen, or by being part of the Land 
Owners Association, is never a constant right. It can be taken away from anyone, once their 
circumstances change. In the case of land, one’s loss of right to ownership has many impacts, 
including the loss of livelihoods.  
 
The prevention of the Chairman of the Land Owners Association from participating in the CDA 
process came about when some land owners, allegedly under the influence of the company and 
chiefs, challenged his ownership of land, arguing that his family had never owned land, apart from 
what was pawned to his father by some community members in the 1970s (Interview with Chairman 
Land Owners Association, Mobimbi, 21 November 2017). In this situation, ordinarily, what should 
be in dispute is not the Chairman’s ownership of land, but rather how the land was acquired. It is 
probable therefore that his exclusion from the process was a function of revenge, as well as an 
attempt to prevent him from influencing the CDA in a direction that did not serve the interests of 
the company and chiefs. In rural Sierra Leone, where chiefs’ powers are largely unrestrained, 
community activists who tend to challenge them often find themselves ostracised, banished or have 
trumped-up allegations made against them to keep them intimidated (Conteh, 2014). What is clear 
in this case is that an individual’s right to participate in the CDA process is not acquired and 
protected by merely being a member of a designated PHC. The complex dynamics of mining 
communities mean that such rights can be transient, and one’s continuing participation is dependent 
on the extent to which other actors think their interests are served.   
 
On the other hand, the case of Tankoro and Gbense Chiefdoms where Koidu Holdings Limited 
operates, illustrates how communities within 30 kilometres of a company’s concession can at best 
be marginalized and even excluded from being part of a PHC, because of historical rivalries among 
community leaders, the influence of national politics and the geographical spread of minerals 
(Interview with Civil Society Activist, Koidu, 29 November 2017). Despite the fact that the 
company’s mine site is located in Tankoro chiefdom, its operations nonetheless directly affect the 
neighbouring chiefdom of Gbense which is approximately two kilometres away. If one were to rely 
exclusively on the law, and using ‘proximity’ as a determinant, Gbense therefore should become 
part of the PHC as much as Tankoro is.  However, Gbense has only been incorporated into the PHC 
on the grounds of tokenism, as well as for purposes of reciprocity, once its own Kimberlite diamond 
mine becomes operational. The chairman of the CDC states the situation clearly:  
 
Actually, it is only Tankoro that is the primary host community. We only brought Gbense on board 
because we feel that they are also affected by the blasting that is normally done by the company. We 
chose to give them 20% of our money so that when their situation comes into being, they will do 
likewise (Interview, Chairman CDC, Koidu, 29 November 2017). 
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This manner in which Gbense Chiefdom was incorporated into the PHC is controversial and 
contravenes the MMA 2009. Here, the dynamics of pre-existing relations between the two 
chiefdoms became far more important in the determination of the PHC, than did provisions of law. 
The Paramount Chief and residents of Gbense challenged the outcome, arguing that they should 
receive 50% of the company’s contribution to the CDA, given that many of the social services in 
their chiefdom, which are more developed, are also used by residents of Tankoro. As the chief noted: 
When we talk about development, people think Gbense should get everything else because all 
government functionaries are here, electricity is here, even when you talk about the hospital the 
referral hospital. Talk that the referral hospital is for the district is a lie. It is in my chiefdom 
(Interview with Paramount Chief of Gbense Chiefdom, Koidu, 30 November 2017). 
Indeed, Koidu Holdings Limited had previously extended support to the chiefdom long before 
discussions about CDAs started (e.g. the rehabilitation the Chiefdom Market), thus recognizing the 
impacts its operations are having on the community (Dalan Development Consultants, 2014).  
However, the Paramount Chief of Tankoro and chiefdom residents have always resented the 
company’s attempt to split benefits, such as employment and community development projects, 
between the two chiefdoms. When, for instance, in 2002 after the civil war had ended, the company 
requested that the two chiefs submit equal numbers of youths to be considered for employment, the 
Paramount Chief of Tankoro challenged the company, noting that only Tankoro youths should 
benefit (Interview with Paramount Chief of Gbense Chiefdom, Koidu, 30 November 2017). In 
addition, these lingering tensions which are now emerging within the CDA process have not been 
helped by the fact that the two chiefs support rival political parties, and each has tried to block the 
other’s political ambitions. As one Civil Society Activist explained: 
The whole issue between the two of them could not be far from politics. The problem started at the 
time when Chief Kamachendeh wanted to run for the second time in Parliament, as Paramount Chief 
Member of Parliament for Kono District. Chief Saquee (of Tankoro Chiefdom) supported Chief 
Fasuluku of Sandor Chiefdom, instead of Kamachendeh. That was where the problem started 
(Interview with Civil Society Activist, Koidu, 29 November 2017). 
Given the long-standing rivalry between the two chiefs and their chiefdoms, it is perhaps not 
surprising that Gbense’s involvement in the CDA process has only been carried out indirectly 
through the Koidu New Sembehun City Council, which will manage the chiefdom’s 20% share. 
Although in this case the participation of the local council is supported by law, and a means through 
which a compromise has been reached between the two rival chiefdoms, its involvement, however, 
illustrates the risks involved in the law granting local councils and the companies exclusive right to 
determine the PHCs. Such risks are often accentuated by the lack of effective accountability 
mechanisms to prevent resource capture, given the strong group solidarity existing among the elite 
(Conteh, 2017). First, by sanctioning only the local councils and mining companies to decide what 
constitutes the PHC, the law takes away the rights “…of the affected communities to participate in 
the decisions that would have an impact on their livelihood” (Nwapi, 2017: 208). Second, although 
the likelihood of local councils themselves directly becoming part of the PHCs is a distant 
probability given the vast expanse of communities adjacent to mining concessions across the 
country, the possibility still exists for them to negatively influence the process of identifying PHCs 
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in ways that favour or disadvantage certain communities in return for political patronage. This, for 
example, has become apparent in other contexts, such as in the role that the councils have played in 
the provision of decentralised health services in the country (Conteh, 2016). 
5. “How can we implement the CDA without the money?” 
Tensions within the law, the politics within the CDA working group, and the disagreements that 
have accompanied the consultations and identification of PHCs, have made the implementation of 
the CDAs challenging. As previously noted, the first CDA was not signed until two years after its 
due date, and getting companies and communities to agree on the former’s contribution has not been 
straightforward, despite provisions in the MMA 2009 and the companies’ MLAs. As with the 
consultations and identification of the PHCs, the signing processes have been embroiled in 
controversies, sometimes resulting in stalemates (Interview with Government of Sierra Leone 
Official, Freetown, 15 September 2017). Even though the contents of the agreements have remained 
largely uncontested, in the case of Koidu Holdings Limited, some stakeholders have questioned 
what they referred to as their ‘technical exclusion’ from the signing of the document (Interview with 
Government of Sierra Leone Official, Freetown, 15 September 2017).  
 
For example, although the Paramount Chief of Gbense signed the document, he questioned the lack 
of a special provision for his signature on the document, unlike his counterpart in Tankoro. Shortly 
after the document was sent to Freetown for the Minister of Mines’ approval, the chief vehemently 
protested, which warranted the Minister to instruct the NMA to prepare a new document reflecting 
the change (Interview with Government of Sierra Leone Official, Freetown, 15 September 2017).  
This was followed by further protest by the Mayor of Koidu New Sembehun City Council, who 
objected to the fact that although the agreement was signed in his municipality and the City Council 
would be managing Gbense Chiefdoms’ share of 20%, no provision was made for him to sign the 
document. The Minister reinstructed the NMA for them to get him to sign. Finally, the minister 
himself raised objections that while provision was made for him to sign, his title – Minister of Mines 
and Minerals – was not stated. The NMA had to then effect the correction before resubmitting it for 
his approval (Interview with Civil Society Activist, Koidu, 29 November 2017). However, it took 
the Minister more than the stipulated 45 days required for him to approve the document (Interview 
with Government of Sierra Leone Official, Freetown, 15 September 2017). Although the objections 
of the Paramount Chief and Mayor may appear mundane and could be dismissed as unnecessary, in 
settings where mistrust among actors has been fostered by decades of rivalries between chiefs and 
their people, even such inadvertent oversights can be interpreted as insidious.  
 
However, perhaps the biggest challenge to the CDA process has been the disagreement over the 
amount of money companies should contribute towards their implementation, and how to deal with 
the “outstanding payments which communities claim the companies owe them, given the absence 
of CDAs at the time” (Interview with Government of Sierra Leone Official, Freetown, 13 July 
2017). With the exception of one of the companies – Shandong Steel – the process of paying CDA 
funds has been tortious, producing varying degrees of contestations and delays, depending on 
communities’ perceived willingness of the companies to pay. In 2016, Shandong Steel shocked 
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stakeholders when it announced that it had ring-fenced its CDA funds for all the years it exported 
iron ore, despite the fact that it had not signed a CDA with its PHC and it had gone into 
administration. At the time of writing, the community was in the process of opening its bank account 
for the company to pay its contribution.  
 
However, Sierra Rutile Limited, which was allowed by the NMA to expend its community 
development funds through the foundation until 2015, has been embroiled in a disagreement with 
the PHC, even though it has not stalled implementation (Interview, Chairman CDC, Mobimbi, 28 
April 2018; Interview with Government of Sierra Leone Official, Freetown, 15 September 2017). 
While the Company paid its CDA contributions for 2016 and 2017, it held back payment for 2015. 
This was due to confusion surrounding a sum of US$ 75,000 paid from the foundation’s account to 
unknown recipients for the implementation of projects, which took place after the NMA had placed 
a moratorium on the use of community development funds until the signing of CDAs (Interview, 
Chairman CDC, Mobimbi, 28 April 2018; Interview with Government of Sierra Leone Official, 
Freetown, 15 September 2017). Company officials have argued that the money was expended by 
the erstwhile Steering Committee on “unspecified projects” and they cannot be held responsible for 
the actions of previous owners and management (Interview, Chairman CDC, Mobimbi, 28 April 
2018). The community, on the other hand, has disputed the company’s stance, arguing that “buyers 
of companies do not only buy assets, they also take on liabilities” (Interview, Chairman CDC, 
Mobimbi, 28 April 2018). As a consequence, community demands and agitation for the 2015 
backlog led the management of Sierra Rutile to institute an ongoing legal action in the High Court 
in Freetown against the Steering Committee and the two district councils of Bonthe and Moyamba, 
both of which were central to the management of the foundation’s funds (Interview, Chairman CDC, 
Mobimbi, 28 April 2018). 
The excuses of convenience which new owners of large-scale mining companies continue to use in 
order to evade the payment of liabilities incurred by previous owners, is not just limited to Sierra 
Rutile Limited. They have also been used by another large-scale companies and are becoming an 
avenue through which communities are easily short-changed, despite the environmental degradation 
and loss of livelihoods they suffer from mining operations. In 2014, London Mining, which had 
operated the Marampa iron ore mine at Lunsar in Port Loko District, went into administration with 
large amounts of CDA contributions owed to its PHC. During the negotiations which saw the sale 
of the company, the NMA unsuccessfully tried to get the potential buyers to agree to the payment 
of all outstanding CDA contributions owed by London Mining. However, Timis Corporation, which 
eventually bought the mine, refused to accept any CDA liabilities, arguing that it only bought assets, 
not liabilities (Interview with Government of Sierra Leone Official, Freetown, 13 July 2017). The 
ownership of the company has since changed hands, and while the new owner – the American 
company, Sierra Leone Mining – has signed a CDA with the community, it has refused to accept 
liabilities incurred by London Mining, advancing a similar argument put forward by Timis 
Corporation.  While the ease with which new owners of mines have been able to absolve themselves 
of any responsibility for CDA liabilities owed by their predecessors has been necessitated by the 
weak economic outlook of the country and the need for the government to be generous to investors 
at the expense of communities, it nonetheless reinforces a dangerous precedent.  In future, it will be 
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difficult to challenge such views of companies on mineral rights ownership, until enforceable 
legislation is enacted and implemented. 
 
However, disagreements over the payment of CDA funds have not only occurred at mine sites with 
unstable mineral rights ownership. In fact, the process has been equally contentious at Koidu 
Holdings Limited’s site, whose ownership has been relatively stable since the enactment of the 
MMA 2009. Soon after the CDA was signed in February 2017, disagreement ensued between the 
company and community over the payment of CDA backlog contributions, dating as far back as 
2011. The company has disputed the community’s claim that it should be paid outstanding 
contributions, noting that:  
 
We have not been sitting idly here, doing nothing. The company gave money to fight Ebola, and we 
have things in the mines that we put monetary value on that we have been giving to the community. 
We didn’t wait for the CDA to be signed. The NMA are doing the calculations of what we have been 
exporting and what the value should be. We will have to sit with them to see what can be taken out. 
The CDA does not say we should go back to 2011 (Interview, Company Executive, Koidu Holdings 
Limited, Koidu 28 March 2017).  
The company has argued that while it had not signed a CDA with its PHC, it still supported projects 
from funds it designated for community development. Thus claims that it should pay backlog funds 
are unfounded. On the other hand, the community has argued that whatever the company had spent 
on community development before the signing of the CDA should be considered “good will, but not 
relevant to the development of the communities, because we were never consulted” (Interview, CDC 
Chairman, Koidu, 23 March 2017). Indeed, although the issue of community consultation in the 
development of projects is recognized in Koidu Holdings Limited’s MLA which states that “…the 
leasee shall consult with the…community to mutually establish plans and programmes…” 
(Government of Sierra Leone, 2010: 16), the community has never been consulted (Interview with 
CDC Chairman, Koidu, 23 March 2017). Thus the exclusion of the community from decision 
making prior to the CDA has created an atmosphere of mistrust, with the community also disputing 
the actual value of the projects which the company implemented before the signing of the CDA. In 
2014, the company claimed it expended US$ 600,000 on community projects in its PHC (BSG 
Resources 2015), providing little or no details of the individual costs of each project. This amount, 
which is three times more than the US$ 198,000 which the company agreed to contribute to the 
CDA for 2016 (Interview with NMA official, Freetown, 4 May 2017), has raised suspicions that it 
has been inflating its pre-CDA community development expenditures (Interview, CDC Chairman, 
Koidu, 23 March 2017). 
Moreover, a list of community development projects implemented since 2011, compiled by Koidu 
Holdings Limited at the request of the NMA, “has raised questions in relation to the company’s 
sincerity” (Interview, CDC Chairman, Koidu, 23 March 2017). The list included a bridge connecting 
the mine site to the community, but mostly used by its vehicles; empty oil drums given to residents 
of Tankoro; and granite chippings spread on the streets of Koidu and Tankoro. According to one 
civil society activist, all of these so-called projects “are things the company doesn’t want because 
of the disruption they’re causing to their operations at the mines, but on which they are now putting 
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monetary value” (Interview with Civil Society Activist, Koidu, 29 November 2017). At the time of 
writing, the NMA had asked the company “to explain the inclusion of goodwill gestures on the list” 
(Interview with NMA official, Freetown, 4 May 2018).  
The practice of companies inflating their expenditure on community development projects, and CSR 
more broadly, is often reinforced by the fact that such expenses are untaxable. It is therefore 
probable that the company’s incentives for overstating its community development expenditure may 
not just stem from the need to avoid paying its backlog CDA funds, but also for tax evasion purposes 
– further depriving the community and the Government of Sierra Leone of much needed revenue. 
Apart from the possibility of the company over-stating its expenditure on community development 
in order to avoid paying the required taxes, to date it has only paid US$ 100,000, slightly more than 
half of its agreed CDA contribution for 2017 (US$ 198,000), arguing that “its difficult financial 
position doesn’t allow it to honour all its commitments to the community” (Interview with NMA 
official, Freetown, 4 May 2018). Community leaders have claimed that the failure of the company 
to pay its full CDA contributions has affected their development plans, and as one of leader 
rhetorically put it, “how can we implement the CDA without the money?” (Interview, CDC 
Chairman, Koidu, 29 November 2017). 
6. Conclusion 
Although the official imperatives driving the redistribution of resource revenues through CDAs are 
rooted in the lessons of conflict and bad governance practices in the mining sector, as argued in this 
paper, their design and implementation have also been shaped by a number of other factors.  These 
include: the laws and traditions governing the ownership of land; elite bargaining schemes prevalent 
in particular mining localities; pre-existing company-community forms of engagements; the ‘image’ 
of a company; and provisions in laws and policies governing mineral wealth redistribution, 
including the mineral lease agreements signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and 
companies.  
The CDA provisions in the MMA 2009 are simultaneously “inclusive” and “exclusive”, obliging 
companies to assist communities that are affected by their operations on the one hand, whilst 
introducing an exclusionary clause that limits companies’ assistance to communities within 30 
kilometres of their concessions, on the other. This paradox presents fertile ground for potential 
future conflicts in mining areas.  Provisions in law for companies to enter into CDAs with their 
PHCs, no matter how limited, are only as good as the degree to which they are enforced. Although 
a “flexible” approach to the implementation of CDAs which appreciates the peculiar circumstances 
of communities provides for a more organic and adaptive process, it nonetheless opens up the 
process to abuse. This was perhaps most apparent in the case of Koidu Holding Limited, where 
Gbense was going to be excluded from the PHC had it not been for future considerations of 
reciprocating Tankoro Chiefdom’s goodwill. Generally, one can observe the malleability of the law, 
either at the local level where stakeholders can choose to dilute its application, or completely ignore 
it; or at the national level where laws can be deliberately designed to be ineffectual, and different 
companies can be made to contribute different percentages to PHCs for the implementation of their 
CDAs.  
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The continuing dominance of “experts” in development processes is manifested in the development 
of the MCDA by the CDA working group, a process which went on for more than a year without 
any representation from the affected communities themselves. The absence of communities’ 
representation in the working group in some ways illustrates the arrogant manner in which “experts” 
often overestimate their abilities, while downplaying those of communities to meaningfully engage 
in, and impact such policy ‘spaces’. However, the emerging tensions within communities so far 
vindicate the need for their inclusion in the process at an early stage. The tensions also illustrate 
how attempts to suppress critical perspectives within the working group may have contributed to an 
oversight of many of the causes of such tensions, while some actors sought to maximise their 
interests against those of their peers and communities. Policy processes are never apolitical; and as 
with the implementation of the CDAs themselves, they can selectively exclude and include actors, 
as well as produce winners and losers.  
In the case of Sierra Leone, the process of designing and implementing CDAs has remained a site 
of contestation that is shaped by politics at a variety of levels. The process of deciding on the PHCs 
has been largely dominated by the same elite actors who previously dominated community 
development ‘spaces’, thus excluding ordinary citizens. On the other hand, while international and 
local civil society organizations have continued to put pressure on companies to do more to 
redistribute wealth among communities affected by their operations, mining companies have either 
done so reluctantly, or have refused to do so, within a dire economic environment in which the 
government has been generous to them as a means of attracting and retaining their investments. This 
situation has been made critical by the fact that the regulator lacks the power to hold companies 
accountable to honour their commitments to PHCs, and is undermined by the actions of politicians. 
This then ensures that companies’ need to maximise profits, while limiting expenditure on the 
development of their PHCs, will go unchallenged.  
 
Although it is perhaps too early to draw any decisive conclusions on the potential of CDAs to 
transform previously short-changed communities in Sierra Leone’s mineral-rich areas, there are a 
number of emerging lessons one can draw from their implementation, which may have implications 
for natural resource policy making more broadly. First, whilst embedding CDAs in mining laws 
reduces the discretion of mining companies in the development of host communities, it is important 
for them to reflect the complexities of the industry, communities and the nature of the impacts of 
mining on communities, regardless of their proximity to mine sites. Whereas the development of a 
model CDA is sometimes desirable in contexts where communities’ capacity to effectively negotiate 
with multinational corporations is weak or non-existent, it is still important for some flexibility to 
be built in such models to respond to changing circumstances. Fears of the dominance of mining 
companies in negotiations can be mitigated by the provision of legal assistance for communities by 
the state.  
 
Further, as donors on the CDA working group pointed out during the drafting of the model CDA, it 
is important for such schemes to be piloted within a few mine sites, ensuring that vital lessons are 
learned, in order to inform national scale-up. Finally, it is fair to argue that the willingness or 
otherwise of mining companies to live up to their CDA commitments, is as good as the ability of 
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governments to effectively regulate them, ensuring that they comply with the terms of such 
agreements and other related laws. This would require the existence of independent regulators, 
capable of standing up to the power and resources of mining companies, in order to hold them 
accountable on the one hand, whilst ensuring that communities allow them to operate without 
disruptions, on the other. Ultimately, one way that governments can get mining companies to take 
their responsibilities and commitments seriously, is to ensure that negotiated CDAs become part of 
the licence application process for companies, rather than making CDAs by-products of licences, 
and agreements between companies and governments.  
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